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Outline of the alternative explanations for the apparent increase in intensity of work examined by Green (2004).And examination of the degree of empirical support for six hypotheses.
Green argues that one important explanation for intensification of work lays in technological changes of recent decades like "just in time" (JIT) production methods and total quality management (TQM), which reduce monitoring cost and which are effort biased that is to say; they have increased the marginal productivity of change. Second aspect of JIT and TQM production methods is that closer matching between available labour with required workflow has its consequence to make better productive use of workers as long they supply high effort, while the productivity of low effort workers remained the same or raised much less. High-commitment Human Resource Policies .Human Resource Management and work effort .
These techniques aimed at increased commitment by employees, which is manifested in increased levels of effort. Effort incentives By offering appropriate rewards (performance related pay, bonuses, effort related promotion), employers can induce employees to supply higher levels of effort. Declining Union Power and Raising Job Insecurity which says firms found themselves to reduce costs and raise quality when union power is lower; also work intensification is adjunct of a job loss brought by declining benefit/wage ratio and Sectorial differences manifested in declining public to private sector workers average pay.
From the preceding discussion Greene proposes following six hypotheses that work is more likely to have been intensified at workplaces : 1.that experienced technical and organizational changes 2.that have introduced multiskilling and improved task flexibility. 3 .that have initiated human resources management techniques designed to endanger greater worker involvement. 4 .that have increased their usage of effort incentives.5.wher the power unions have decrease 6.where there is rising job insecurity. To test this hypothesis Green used data from cross-sectional Workplace Employee Relations Survey (1998). He specifies model 2 where dependent variable change in effort is regressed on the variables change in: technology, flexibility, high involvement policies, effort incentives, union power and insecurity. In Table 4 3
Column (1) Therefore there are two specifications: one with and one without wages and hours. The results in column 1 show that coefficient on "1997" variable is negative ,but insignificant, in this column hours and income are not controlled for. This coefficient on 1997 variable is negative and significant in column 2; an employee with same hours and real wage is less satisfied in 1997 than in 1989.In Table 5 takes various measures of job outcome such as: high income, hours preferences, advancement opportunities, secure job, hard work, good job content, good relations at work again there are used two specifications. In row 1 are reproduce the estimated coefficients on the 1997 year dummy form Table 4 , hours preference variable is ordered, higher values indicate relative desire for greater hours of work. These findings are similar to base regression, and show that in seven OECD countries, there is little evidence of rise in job quality.
Equality feeling of job security fell between 1989 and 1997 and there is no significant change in job content. In this regression a number of measures of job quality have trended downwards.
In Table 6 (BHPS) first column shows results from ordered probit estimation of pooled data(as if each observation comes from a different individual) and second column panel data(same individuals are interviewed every year),the estimated coefficients on wave dummies are all negative and jointly significant suggesting overall decline in job satisfaction,1992 is a base year.
Results in regressions that are done for other job outcomes and the results are more lees the same in the regressions that do not control for hours. There is negative correlation between job satisfaction and firm size, and job satisfaction minimizes at about 40 in pooled regression.
What is meant by the term rat race equilibrium in Lander et al.? What are the characteristics of large law firms that favour such equilibrium?
"Rat race" equilibrium is a suboptimum situation in which employees work inefficiently long hours. Given that firms use willingness to work long hours, as an indicator for hiring or promoting employees, issues on adverse selection and asymmetric information may appear in determination of work hours. Employees desiring short hours will have an incentive to camouflage themselves as long hour-worker accepting to work longer they prefer. Firms will respond by establishing work norms with hours long enough to discourage a shot-hour employee from pretending to be long-run employee. The result is that employees will work inefficiently long hours; opposite of full information equilibrium situation (Stiglitz 1976); when no actor has incentive to alter his behaviour. Now they will work more hours then utility maximizing number of hours conditional on their wage. Large law firm have simple internal structure i.e. associates and partners.
Promotion decision allows associates to purchase an equity stake in the enterprise. Second and more important feature is that there is always some degree of revenue sharing among partners.
Income sharing characteristics of partnerships creates strong incentives to screen potential partners for their propensity to work hard. Rat race equilibrium is expected in any group where group members benefit from the productivity of other group members, the output of the group can be significantly influenced by the work effort of individual members and where the members of group can establish norms. In Table 2 5 nearly2/3 (65.41%) of the associates indicated they would prefer reducing work hours and keeping income unchanged over the coming year. Only 25,56% of respondents wanted to keep hours unchanged and enjoy 5% raise in income.
The statistics in Table 2 is not consistent with the conventional labour supply model when a large fraction of associate lawyers are on the backward bending portion of their labour supply curves. However, in the model labour supply elasticity is 10 times larger than reported in the literature. Second, backward bending labour supply curve suggests that associates should cut back their hours as wage rise. In the surveyed firms salaries increase by 7% per year, but there is no evidence of reduction o billable and non-billable hours among the senior associates. Third, backward bending supply curve suggests associates who want to reduce their hours have, on average, higher income than associates who want to keep their current hours. The data suggests that average income for these two groups is virtually identical. In Panel A(Preferences when others increase hours by 5%) in Table 7 we observed that significant number of respondents wanted to increase the desired level of work hours if others were doing the same.
Indeed the hypothesis that the distribution of original hour's preferences was identical with the distribution of preferences when other associates increase work hours is strongly rejected. In Panel B (Preferences when others reduce hours by 5%).The associates who like their current hours and the desirability of these hours only increased as others reduce hours. And only small portion of associates changed their choice. This is consistent with the explanation that associates want to work long hours (Rat race equilibrium hypothesis). Alternatively the explanation might be in the coordination problem; i.e. .when associates are working face-to-face 5% increase in working hours would require other group members to increase hours 5%.Which is not possible because the type of activity consist of solitary library work on legal research in writing and this does not require face-to-face contact.
Summary and answer to a question: Can, and should, labour market regulation or other policies address this issue?
Technical innovations and new forms of organization have been associated with greater managerial control over the labour process which can bring higher effort levels and are effort biased i.e. productivity is more dependent upon the effort level. Second explanation of work intensification is the use of high commitment policies, and decline in collective bargaining which is found to raise effort.
Job values Clark (2005) shows that are stable, so they are unlikely to explain movements in overall job satisfaction. Overall measures of job outcomes are either flat or falling, despite favourable movements in hours, wages, and job security. Third, there is no evidence of increasing inequality in some measures of job outcomes, as revealed by index of ordinal variation. Also there is no further erosion in job satisfaction gap between union members and non-members in Great Britain, except job security on the union member's side. Satisfaction with work itself has moved sharply downwards Good jobs are being replaced by the bad jobs due to changes in job content.
Another suboptimal solution is "Rat Race" equilibrium when employees work inefficiently long hour's conditional on their wages. Since the overall effect will have detrimental effect upon welfare society labour market regulatory policy should address these issues. Overworking can be restricted by setting maximum hours. The inefficient mix of job outcomes should be changed by increasing the efficacy of Job security and Job Interest, which are valued higher by workers.
Appendices
Appendix 1 Table 4 Determinants of Work Intensification , 1993-1998 Note : Standard errors in parantheses.* significant at 5%**significant at 1% Standard errors in parentheses * significant at 5%**significant at 1% 
